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For years, international energy ex-
perts have stressed the increasing 
strategic importance of supply securi-
ty   among the goals to which econo-
mic efficiency and environmental 
compatibility also belong. But only 
now,  in the aftermath of the winter 
2005-2006 gas conflict between Rus-
sia and Ukraine, has the future secu-
rity of German and European energy 
supplies become the focus of a broad 
debate. Because the Russian cutbacks 
in gas deliveries affected EU member 
states as well as Ukraine, the episode 
has debunked a number of long-stan-
ding assumptions underlying 
Germany’s energy and foreign poli-
cies, among them that: 
• oil and gas are exclusively econo-
mic goods, not strategic ones. Ac-
cording to this view, energy resour-
ces are not part of the foreign and 
security policy strategy of other 
countries, and the energy policies 
of other countries strictly adhere to 
the rules of market economics;
• the security of the energy supply 
is no longer an important factor 
and can be left to private utility 
companies;
• disruptions in regional or global 
energy supply can be offset by other 
oil and gas imports at any time;
• Russia under President Putin has 
steadily strengthened its market 
orientation;
• never having used energy exports 
as a political weapon, not even du-
ring the cold war, Russia will al-
ways prove to be a reliable energy 
partner for Europe;
• Russia’s need to export its oil and 
gas to the European market has led 
to mutual dependence that preclu-
des the instrumentalization of Rus-
sian energy and pipeline policy as 
a factor of foreign policy in the age 
of globalization.
For many years, these assumptions 
made it possible to ignore that Moscow 
has indeed used its energy exports and 
pipeline monopoly as an instrument of 
foreign policy to intimidate and black-
mail neighboring states—albeit with 
little success—since the demise of the 
Soviet Union. Holding more than 25 
percent of the world’s natural gas and 
hard coal reserves and 6 percent of the 
world’s oil reserves, Russia has also 
considerably increased its strategic 
position in many of the successor sta-
tes to the USSR and in the new EU 
member states. It has done so by 
buying up utility companies, pipelines, 
refineries and infrastructure through 
Gazprom and other giant energy cor-
porations and thus expanding its 
monopoly. Gazprom will seek direct 
access to customers in the European 
Union and Germany in order to expand 
its market share from 26 percent at 
present to 38 percent by 2020. Russia 
is striving to build a gas cartel with 
which it would be able to dictate more 
than just prices. To date, however, 
neither Germany nor Europe has enga-
ged in sustained analysis and discus-
sion of how, under these circum-
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Europe’s Next Cold War 
The European Union needs a plan to secure its energy supply
By Frank Umbach
Ensuring Germany’s—and Europe’s—supply of energy is still viewed 
largely as an economic issue, not as a matter of foreign and security 
policy. The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine has prompted 
warnings against excessive dependency on Russia. What are the 
consequences for the security of Germany’s energy supply?
Global Issues
 IP • Summer • 2006 Umbach / Europe’s Energy 65
stances, to liberalize the German and 
European gas markets, which are in 
the grip of oligopolies in any case.
Other international economic and 
political conditions, too, have changed 
to such a degree that it is useless to 
look at earlier decades and assert that 
“everything went well after all.” Until 
2004 observers in Germany also over-
looked Asian, especially Chinese, 
energy demand and its implications 
for Europe’s foreign and energy secu-
rity policy. Germany did not wake up 
to reality until its industry experi-
enced mounting difficulty with 
imports of raw materials because 
China, India and other states were 
prepared to pay far more than cus-
tomary international market prices 
for them. On March 8,  2005, the Fed-
eral Association of German Industry 
(BDI) held a congress on protecting 
Germany’s supply of raw materials 
and energy, its first such event in 
more than twenty years. Since then, a 
high-ranking BDI group has been cre-
ated to address issues connected to 
international raw materials and to 
formulate a national strategy.
Given this state of affairs, it is not 
surprising that the matter of securing 
Germany’s energy supplies still lies 
solely in the hands of the ministries 
of economics and the environment, 
an arrangement unlike those in other 
EU member states. However, it means 
that the expertise existing in the 
foreign ministry and the defense 
ministry of foreign countries and 
global regions has no bearing on 
overall strategy for shaping policy on 
energy security.
By contrast, the EU Commission’s 
2000 Green Paper on aspects of the 
European energy supply systemati-
cally examined the future of its secu-
rity. Energy security has also become 
an integral part of the European 
Union’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP). It was incorpo-
rated into the European security pol-
icy of December 2003 and institu-
tionalized as energy dialogs conduct-
ed throughout the world. In Germany, 
this EU policy went almost unno-
ticed. Instead, the debates on energy 
policy became ideological disputes 
between advocates and opponents of 
nuclear energy and remained exceed-
ingly parochial. Non-economic, par-
ticularly geopolitical, factors (such as 
the political stability of the crude-oil 
and natural-gas exporters or their 
interests and motivations) thereby 
did not figure in the analyses of inter-
national energy security. Or forecasts 
of oil and gas prices made light of 
them as singular or temporary events, 
dismissing them as distortions.
In the last two decades, the topic of 
energy security has effectively been 
left to private energy companies, 
whose corporate strategy is, of course, 
primarily profit driven. Even after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, which generated increasing 
global discussion about the future 
political stability of the Middle East as 
the center of the world’s crude oil sup-
ply, the security of supply was not 
something that greatly occupied Ger-
many. This lack of response is all the 
more incomprehensible when it is 
remembered that Germany has 
declared that it will abandon nuclear 
energy by 2021 and is thinking of 
drastically reducing coal extraction 
for environmental reasons. But 
improving energy efficiency and con-
servation and developing renewable 
energy sources alone will not fully 
ensure base load electricity produc-
tion by 2030 that will compensate for 
phasing out nuclear energy. This out-
look will presumably make it neces-
sary to import gas (chiefly from Rus-
sia) in quantities even greater than 
Germany currently does.
This outlook will 
presumably make it 
necessary to 
import gas (chiefly 
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Why Oil Prices Will Continue to Rise
Unilateralist trends in national energy 
policies and a penchant for renation-
alization and state expropriation are 
spreading worldwide (for example in 
Russia, Asia and Latin America). This 
development is calling into question 
forms of multilateral cooperation and 
the market-driven orientation. The 
result is both a global zero-sum game 
over rights of access to oil and gas 
fields and a “great game” about pipe-
lines that is by no means confined to 
Central Asia. As the Russian-Ukrai-
nian contention over natural gas 
shows, the latter game is being played 
in Europe as well.
In this context it is worth noting 
that fossil energy sources (especially 
oil and gas) will continue to remain 
the backbone of the global energy sys-
tem until 2030. They will have to 
meet up to 90 percent of the global 
increase in energy demand. Although 
natural gas is the world’s most rapidly 
growing energy source (2.4 percent 
annually) and although its extraction 
is being doubled, oil, which now cov-
ers about 37 percent of the world’s 
energy demand, will remain the most 
important energy source.
Under these circumstances it is 
short-sighted to exclusively pursue a 
“market approach” that fails to take 
domestic and regional conditions 
into account. For example, the cur-
rent high price of oil can essentially 
be explained by four factors a (with a 
terror-related bonus that adds eight 
to nine dollars):
• the underestimated global demand 
from Asia (China and India above 
all);
•the squeeze on surplus global pro-
duction capacities that can be quick-
ly mobilized in certain countries if 
oil production is disrupted;
• limited refinery and transport ca-
pacities;
• multiple political crises in oil- and 
gas-exporting states and natural ca-
tastrophes that lead to disruptions 
in production and export, causing 
global bottlenecks.
Three additional factors are likely to 
play decisive roles in determining the 
structure of international energy secu-
rity in the medium term:
• the concentration of oil and gas re-
serves in politically unstable coun-
tries of the Middle East (with 65 
percent of the world’s remaining 
crude oil and 34 percent of the 
world’s remaining natural gas being 
located in the Persian Gulf alone);
• the gigantic need for investment to 
preserve the stability of oil and gas 
supplies throughout the world;
• intensifying trends toward rena-
tionalization and state expropria-
tion that diminish efficiency (e.g., 
by undermining cost consciousness, 
reducing productivity and exacer-
bating corruption) and therefore 
infringe on the global stability of 
the energy supply.
The EU Energy Security Policy 
Although harking back to the treaty 
that created the European Coal and 
Steel Community in 1951, the Euro-
pean Union possesses significant 
authority only over nuclear energy 
and, for historical reasons,  the coal 
sector. Given the regional and global 
interdependencies that influence 
energy policy, this sphere would seem 
to be the most natural field for 
enhanced co-operation. But by and 
large the community still has no juris-
diction over it—with the exception of 
the clauses for a fair competition and 
environmental policies. Energy policy 
remains a matter of the individual EU 
member states.
The European Union of 25 member 
states is already the world’s largest 
energy importer, and its dependence 
The European 
Union of 25 
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largest energy 
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on imports of crude oil and natural 
gas in particular is steadily growing. It 
was therefore with concern that the 
EU Commission’s Green Paper on 
energy security (November 2000) 
forecast that the dependence on ener-
gy imports will escalate from 50 to 70 
percent by 2030. The share of EU 
energy consumption covered by 
imports is likely to rise from 76 to 90 
percent in the case of oil; from 40 to 
70 percent for natural gas; and from 
50 to more than 70 percent for coal. 
The reason is not so much a growing 
need for energy but rather the dwin-
dling of Europe’s own oil and gas 
reserves in the North Sea.
The worry about energy security is 
also stated in the EU Commission’s 
November 2005 progress report on 
the European single market for ener-
gy. In June 2005 the Commission had 
already accepted a new Green Paper 
on energy efficiency that called for 
energy consumption to be cost effec-
tively reduced by as much as 20 per-
cent by 2020 through change in con-
sumer behavior and through energy 
efficient technologies. However, 
experts are skeptical whether conser-
vation on this scale is realistic.
As with the EU Commission, the 
foreign ministries of individual EU 
member states have meanwhile begun 
to analyze the geopolitical and foreign 
policy dimensions of ensuring 
Europe’s energy supply in the future. 
The British Foreign Office, for exam-
ple, has adopted its own energy strat-
egy. The Netherlands has elaborated 
an internal statement of principles by 
its foreign ministry and is seeking to 
discuss it with the German foreign 
ministry, which was not conceptually 
prepared for this crux of German 
energy, economic, foreign and securi-
ty policy until the end of 2005. The 
EU commission, by contrast, has 
intensified its energy dialogs with 
many states and organizations within 
the frameworks of the CFSP and its 
own energy foreign policy as well as 
other contexts. It is also pushing for-
ward with specific energy projects, 
including some with OPEC and the 
Gulf states.
How Reliable is Russia?
Former German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder is not the only actor to have 
endorsed a close strategic energy part-
nership with Russia—so has the Euro-
pean Union. Compared to Germany, 
though, the European Union has 
argued for much greater diversifica-
tion of energy imports, notably those 
of gas, say, from the Caspian region. 
Russian natural gas presently accounts 
for 41 percent of Germany’s gas 
imports and 35 percent of the gas con-
sumption, and those figures are threat-
ening to rise to a level ranging between 
60 and 70 percent. The agreed con-
struction of a 1200-kilometer (745-
mile) northern European gas pipeline 
on the bed of the Baltic Sea only 
heightens the probability of this 
increase, especially because a second 
leg of the pipeline is expected to guar-
antee Germany a total annual volume 
of 55 billion cubic meters of gas. (Ger-
many currently consumes 95 billion 
cubic meters of gas per year.) Theo-
retically,  this way Germany could 
cover approximately 50 percent of its 
gas consumption and up to 36 percent 
of its total energy consumption. But 
the country would be much more vul-
nerable than it presently is.
This assessment applies not only to 
the case in which Moscow closes the 
gas valve but also to conceivable ter-
rorist attacks on the two underwater 
pipelines, which can cause far greater 
environmental damage than overland 
pipelines. With terrorist attacks on 
pipelines increasing around the world, 
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adequately weighed either by Gaz-
prom’s German gas partners or by 
German policymakers.
Representatives of German busi-
ness have hailed the diversification of 
pipelines as protection of Germany’s 
energy supply for decades through 
partnership with Russia. But long-
term delivery contracts cannot auto-
matically be equated with improving 
the safety of the country’s energy 
supply. On the contrary, Germany is 
becoming even more dependent on 
Russia. And whether German compa-
nies will acquire strategic market 
advantages in the key sectors of the 
Russian economy as hoped by the 
chancellor’s office under Schröder 
remains uncertain.
Nor is the northern European gas 
pipeline an example of a genuinely 
equal partnership between German 
gas companies and Gazprom; Gaz-
prom controls 51 percent of the orga-
nization. Routing the gas pipeline 
through the Baltic Sea and thereby 
avoiding transit through Ukraine, 
the Baltic countries and Poland, a 
proposal that is two to three times 
more expensive than a land-based 
pipeline, came from Gazprom and 
the Kremlin and is based primarily 
on geopolitical considerations. Ger-
man politicians who welcome the 
Baltic Sea pipeline yet criticize the 
high gas prices in Germany do not 
realize that such pipeline projects 
and the long-term delivery contracts 
between German gas companies and 
Gazprom are also dubious on 
economic grounds, since there are 
more favorable alternatives. There is 
no recognition of the connection 
between the liberalization of the gas 
market in Germany and the Europe-
an Union; the monopoly that Gaz-
prom has on the market; and the 
troubling dependence at the expense 
of the consumer, the German econo-
my, and, ultimately, the future secu-
rity of supply. The proposal by Ger-
man Chancellor Angela Merkel that 
Poland and the Baltic countries be 
brought into the pipeline project can 
indeed be thought of as a litmus test 
for Russian pipeline policies, since it 
is diametrically opposed to Moscow’s 
geopolitical objectives. Hardly sur-
prising, no progress on it has been 
made. Rather, it is a symbol for the 
lack of a common EU energy policy.
Moscow’s “Energy Imperialism”
Moscow has subtly and sometimes 
not so subtly exploited both the 
power it derives from its raw materi-
als and the energy dependence of its 
neighboring states in eastern Europe 
and the Caspian region as an instru-
ment of foreign policy and security 
policy. It is thus fundamentally prob-
lematic for Germany and the Euro-
pean Union to become heavily depen-
dent on imports of Russian gas, espe-
cially since attempts at renationaliza-
tion have become apparent in the 
Russian parliament and the Kremlin 
since the beginning of the Putin era. 
These stirrings have been largely 
ignored thus far, but the doctoral the-
sis by Putin in 1997 and an article of 
his in 1999 communicated his under-
standing of what the Russian resource 
sector means for the state and for 
foreign policy. Having called the dis-
integration of the Soviet Union the 
“greatest catastrophe of the twenti-
eth century,” Putin sees this “strate-
gic sector” not only as a key to 
economic renaissance but also or 
even primarily as an instrument of 
Russia’s geopolitical reascendance as 
a future superpower in energy.
Although foreign companies are 
now able to increase their stake in 
Russian companies, the only role 
open to them is that of junior part-
ner. Moreover, Russia has now passed 
It is thus 
fundamentally 
problematic for 
Germany and the 
European Union to 
become heavily 
dependent on 
imports of Russian 
gas.
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legislation that curbs the rights of 
foreign investors still further, permit-
ting only companies registered in 
Russia to participate in state auc-
tions of extraction licenses.
The European Commission and 
the International Energy Agency 
have not been the only actors in 
recent years to warn Germany against 
inordinate dependence on Russia for 
energy; the governments of Great 
Britain and France have done the 
same. Although the European Union 
and Germany have no real alterna-
tive to a strategic partnership with 
Russia in energy matters, they do not 
have to make themselves so depen-
dent. As shown by the failure to rati-
fy the European Energy Charter and 
the transit treaty, the interests of the 
two sides are anything but compati-
ble at the moment. A naïve and 
uncritical attitude on Germany’s part 
is counterproductive, not only 
because it shackles foreign policy 
(“silence for gas”) but also because it 
does nothing to support reformers of 
domestic policy who are working to 
align Moscow’s energy policy with 
market economics.
The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict
The fivefold upward adjustment of 
gas prices for Ukraine confirms that 
foreign policy is behind the Kremlin’s 
pricing policy, which rewards allies 
and punishes renegades by means of 
a graduated price system. In August 
2005 Russia’s foreign minister indi-
cated a radical shift in policy on 
energy prices, saying in an interview 
that the Kremlin would no longer 
tolerate any agreement with neigh-
boring states and EU member states 
unless Moscow economically and 
politically benefited from granting 
discount prices. In that sense, raising 
the price of Russian gas to world lev-
els for Ukraine was merely a pretext. 
Moreover, Moscow is keen on buying 
up the Ukrainian pipelines and has 
tried to influence the Ukrainian par-
liamentary elections in March 2006. 
Just recently Moscow was able to bol-
ster its political market power over 
Europe’s energy supply by taking 
over control of the Belarusian section 
of the Yamal natural gas pipeline.
The simultaneous reprimand that 
Kiev was threatening European sup-
ply security by illegally siphoning off 
gas and fomenting political confron-
tation with Moscow (about 80 per-
cent of Russia’s gas deliveries to 
Europe run through Ukraine) served 
the objective of lending additional 
legitimacy to the Baltic Sea pipeline. 
The fact that representatives of Ger-
many’s gas utility companies accept-
ed the Russian propaganda uncriti-
cally was hardly surprising. The EU 
Commission’s reticent response was 
less understandable. Like the new 
German federal government, it treat-
ed the gas conflict at first as an 
energy issue rather than as a prob-
lem concerning foreign policy. 
Although hectic diplomacy to settle 
the dispute did take place behind the 
scenes, the Commission came across 
as politically helpless. Brussels had 
evidently assumed an EU-Russia 
energy partnership based on quite 
different conditions.
By closing the Russian gas valve, 
Moscow demonstrated its increasing 
willingness to instrumentalize its 
energy-related power for foreign poli-
cy ends as well. For Europe, the 
United States and the World Trade 
Organization, that act makes Russian 
energy policy not only a challenge to 
economic policy but also a problem 
for foreign policy. Neither the EU nor 
Germany is prepared for this kind of 
conflict. Nonetheless, there are cer-
tainly lessons for the future security 
of Europe’s energy supply.
The fivefold upward 
adjustment of gas 
prices for Ukraine 
confirms that 
foreign policy 
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Lessons for Germany
The security of Germany’s energy 
supply and its vulnerability because of 
dependence on Russian natural gas 
did not land on the political agenda 
until the gas conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine put it there. German 
policymakers owe the Russian presi-
dent thanks for this service. Without 
it, the German discussions about ener-
gy security would probably be con-
fined exclusively to climate protection 
and economic efficiency for another 
ten years. But the political fallout 
stems less from the future scarcity of 
available energy resources than from 
their concentration in only a few 
regions, above all those that are usu-
ally politically unstable.
The criticism that the international 
energy organizations, the European 
Union, and individual EU member 
states have leveled at Germany’s 
excessive dependence on imports of 
Russian gas is something that Ger-
many should take seriously. What is 
often perceived abroad to be a neo-
Wilhelmine energy policy—Germany 
as the world’s elixir—clashes with 
the picture of Germany’s economic 
decline and calls for critical self-
examination. The stance Germany 
has taken on energy in recent years 
has probably been the country’s poli-
cy area least compatible with that of 
the European Union.  This mismatch 
is attributable to more than just the 
enduring ideological obsession with 
abandoning nuclear energy, an atti-
tude even less able to attract majority 
support in the European Union today 
than in the past. Germany has over-
looked the fact that the EU Commis-
sion has seen energy security as an 
integral part of CFSP since 2001. For 
that reason neither Germany nor the 
European Union can leave the secu-
rity of supply mainly or solely to pri-
vate industry.
When considering the question of 
Russia’s reliability, the proponents of 
mutual dependence between Germany 
and the European Union on the one 
hand and Russia on the other over-
look a key difference between the 
present and the era of the Soviet 
Union. In those days gas exports to 
western Europe were mostly of great 
economic importance to the Soviet 
“colossus on clay feet.” Today Putin 
sees gas exports essentially as a vehi-
cle of foreign policy and of Russia’s 
reemergence as a superpower that acts 
in a more modern fashion by wielding 
monopolistic power over the market 
to discipline renegades and demand 
respect for Russian interests. From 
these viewpoints of both domestic and 
foreign policy, Russia’s reliability as 
Germany’s energy partner is extreme-
ly dubious.
These considerations lead to sev-
eral conclusions for German energy 
security:
• European and global supply security 
must receive much more attention 
than in the past. The intention of 
elaborating “an overall national en-
ergy policy concept” is therefore 
welcome. However, to enhance the 
compatibility between the concepts 
contributed by the EU Commission 
and those advanced by important 
EU member states, including Ger-
many, this work must also draw on 
the expertise that Germany’s foreign 
ministry and the defense ministry 
have in foreign policy, security poli-
cy and the individual foreign coun-
tries. It is therefore not enough to 
leave the preliminary work entirely 
to the ministries of economics and 
of the environment as is currently 
the case. To ensure that conceptual-
ization of this kind has input from 
the various portfolios, it should be 
guided by the federal chancellor’s 
office and an institutionalized fed-
Germany has 
overlooked the fact 
that the EU 
Commission has 
seen energy 
security as an 
integral part of 
CFSP since 2001.
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eral (or national) security council.
• It is time for a common European 
energy policy, as called for by Tony 
Blair before the European Parlia-
ment in October 2005.
• The recent altercation over gas 
shows the necessity of achieving a 
balanced mix of energy sources that 
not only provides for development 
of renewable energies and increases 
energy efficiency but also extends 
the remaining life of nuclear power 
plants and retains domestic coal 
production until at least 2030.
• At best, the planned Baltic Sea pipe-
line will improve Germany’s supply 
security in a purely technical sense. 
Otto Graf Lambsdorff is therefore 
correct in calling for a renegotiation 
of the pipeline so as to bring in Po-
land and the Baltic states—though 
it seems unrealistic.
• The German gas industry, too, 
should critically reconsider its cor-
porate strategy of relying primarily 
on a strategic alliance with Russia, 
for it could prove to be economi-
cally shortsighted as well. To a 
certain degree there is no alterna-
tive to an energy partnership with 
Russia and Gazprom, but it should 
be expanded into a truly equal part-
nership. The purported interde-
pendence of the two countries is a 
myth. The German gas industry is 
well advised to increase the diversi-
fication of its imports in order to 
spread the business risks.
• The German gas industry should 
press forward with the option of 
liquid gas imports by building a 
suitable terminal in the North Sea 
port city of Wilhelmshaven. The 
gas companies should also accept 
the invitation to join the Nabucco 
project, which provides for the 
construction of a gas pipeline run-
ning from Turkey through Bulgar-
ia, Romania, and Hungary. Policy-
makers and the business commu-
nity should realize that Germany 
has a relatively advantageous geo-
graphic location for importing gas 
from all directions.
